The Special Forces Groups are where America’s Green Berets get to work. 5th Special Forces Group has been involved in every conflict, known and unknown, across the Middle East since its inception. Doing hard things isn’t considered an ask; it’s the standard.
To dig into the mission of The Legion, Fran Racioppi traveled to Fort Campbell, KY to sit down with the command team, COL Gabe Szody and CSM Travis Esterby, to define what Combat Power means to Special Forces and how the Army’s Warfighting Functions are applied across Special Forces detachments.
They explained why Green Beret’s regional affiliation is critical to expertise, how detachments are simultaneously preparing to combat peer adversaries and terrorist organizations, and how America is tying in cyber and space at the most tactical level.
COL Szody and CSM Esterby also share their perspective on recruiting, how technology is changing the Special Forces teams, and how they are enforcing standards at every level.
Watch, listen or read our chilly spring morning conversation from Gabriel Field as we honor 5th SFG’s sacrifice and contributions to America’s national security.
The Jedburgh Podcast is brought to you by University of Health & Performance, providing our Veterans world class education and training as fitness and nutrition entrepreneurs.
Follow the Jedburgh Podcast and the Green Beret Foundation on social media. Listen on your favorite podcast platform, read on our website, and watch the full video version on YouTube as we show why America must continue to lead from the front, no matter the challenge.
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Colonel Szody, Sergeant Major Esterby, welcome to The Jedburgh Podcast.
Thanks for having us.
Thanks to the whole staff from the 5th Group. Everybody has been amazing and welcomed us here. We’re on Gabriel Field. Not everybody has their own parade field, but you got one here.
We’re a little unique here at 5th Group, but Gabriel Field has a history behind it. If you talk to anybody at 5th Group, what they’re going to tell you is that this field right here is the center of gravity in terms of the 5th Group footprint. While we do a lot of change of command responsibilities out here, this is our memorial field. If you look around the field, there are a number of trees, 69 in total, and 30 pavers that commemorate our fallen since the group moved here in 1988. This is a very special place for the group. As I said, it’s our center of gravity, and I think it’s unique to this organization.
Gabriel Field is really the center of gravity in terms of the 5th Special Forces Group’s footprint.
Twenty-five Medal of Honor recipients, more Medal of Honor recipients than any other O-6 headquarters. Some divisions don’t have as many, but that feeds into the culture of the unit. If you think about when the unit was created in 1961, and then less than a year later, the group headquarters goes to Vietnam, and it’s there for several years, that breeds a certain kind of culture that carries on today.
We’re going to talk about it because I’m going to tell you. As you know, as big fans of The Jedburgh Podcast, you have seen over the last year or so that we have focused a lot of our conversations at the strategic level, and we’ve been fortunate enough to have on all the senior leadership from Special Operations Command. We’ve had General Braga. We’ve had General Ferguson. We had Sergeant Major Dave Waldo. We had Chief Mosqueda. We had Sergeant Major of the Army Weimer on. We were able to get a glimpse into where we are as an organization of the Army Special Operations.
Where’s the Army writ large going? How are we making this transition from twenty-plus years of the global war on terror to what the new battlefield is? All those conversations have been at their strategic level, which is important to understand, but that’s not where the rubber meets the road. Where the rubber meets the road is at the tactical level, and that’s at our Special Forces Group, so it’s an honor to be here, having spent many years with you.
It’s awesome now to be on this side and be able to sit down, watch you progress, and take command of a group. It’s awesome to see, so congratulations. I do remember when there was a young Major Szody walking through the hallways, but it’s awesome to see that and to get your perspective on how you’re taking all of those strategic initiatives and applying that tactical level. That’s what we’re going to talk about, and we’re going to do it through the lens of the warfighting functions. You guys know I like doctrine. Anyone who watches the show knows what I do.
The Army’s warfighting functions are, by definition, the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical and operational level commanders. In other words, it’s our combat power, and it’s defined by command and control, movement and maneuver, sustainment, protection, fires, and intelligence. That’s how we’re going to talk about the tactical operation.
We’re going to start with command and control. We’re going to talk about the 5th Group. We’re going to talk about what it means to lead this organization, command and control, or C2. It’s about leadership. How do you, as a leader, inspire and empower others to do something they may not otherwise do, not because you told them, but because they want to? What’s the mission of the 5th Special Forces Group?
The mission of the 5th Special Forces Group is to win our assigned task. Right now, we have a battalion deployed at any given time. We’ve had elements deployed since 2001 to CENTCOM. The 5th Group’s job is to go forward and win our nation’s battles, whatever that may be. We’ve been doing it for a long time. I’ve got a trick question for you. Can you name the combat operations that the 5th Group has been involved in since 1990?
The mission of 5th Special Forces Group is to win our assigned tasks.
Can I pick D, all of the above?
You got it. The 5th Group has been involved in every combat operation that the US has been involved in since 1990 and Vietnam as well, but that’s bred into the organization. That’s part of the culture in the DNA of this unit. I don’t need to inspire too many people. I think the culture does that by itself, but the mission of the group is to accomplish whatever task we are given by our operational headquarters. Right now, that task is firmly rooted in the Middle East, the Levant, and the rest of the Central Command’s area of responsibility.
You’ve been a part of the group, Sergeant Major, maybe from the beginning?
Yeah, I got here in 2005. I’ve never left, so about twenty straight years.
How do you see that evolving?
We’ve definitely got younger, but I think we’re more capable right now than we’ve ever been. We have the right people. We’re training on the right things. There’s less ambiguity in what we want you to do, more specific focus on this, and that top thing is lethality and being ready.
Let’s talk about that for a second because your boss, General Ferguson, a great fan and guest of the show, has been on numerous times, has talked about his priorities, lethality, adaptability, and creativity. When you look at your priorities and your vision for the group, what are the top priorities?
The top priority is to ensure that whatever battalion is going out the door is trained and ready to execute its mission. They’ve got a series of pre-mission training events that they have to do leading up to their deployment, which they’ve successfully accomplished before they walk out the door. The second priority that we have is ensuring that our detachments and our people have mastered what we call foundational skills, and those foundational skills are rooted in lethality. General Ferguson talks about it a lot. It’s something that CSM and I have been all in on since we have been in the seat.
A lot of people talk about being good at the basics. It’s always driven me nuts. What does that mean? What we’ve done is define what those basics are. The basics, what we call foundational skills, are rooted in lethality because at the end of the day, if you look back at our history, what we’ve done, and what we think we’re going to do in the future, it’s all about lethality. There are some other missions that SF does, but one of the things we can’t assume risk on is not being good at lethality.
The third priority we’ve got is modernizing at scale. I know we’ll get into it a little bit later, but we have to keep pace with our modernization efforts. We have a colloquial way of saying what we do in terms of mission. We have our assigned mission, and we have our design mission. Our assigned mission keeps us busy, always deployed, always doing something forward, but we also have this design mission aspect of the unit, where we have to continue to modernize to keep pace. We have to have a foot in both worlds because our side mission isn’t going away anytime soon, and we’ve got to keep pace. Those are probably my top three priorities.
A big evolution has occurred over the last couple of years since the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our elected leaders have put a final chapter on what we called the global war on terror. You talked about having a foot in both worlds. Those worlds are the worlds of terrorism, and there are the worlds of what we’re calling large-scale combat operations, or LSCO, as we’ve talked about on previous episodes.
The reality and what you’re saying is that both of these worlds exist. We may have changed the terms, but the reality is we’ve got to be prepared for those, and so going into that second war fighting function, we talk about movement and maneuver. At the end of the day, it’s our ability to close with and destroy the enemy, the lethality that you’re talking about. Our Special Forces Groups are regionally aligned. The Middle East is the 5th Group’s regional alignment. Talk for a second about more broadly, why is regional alignment important for Special Forces? Now, we’re going to get into the Middle East.
Sure. Regional alignment is important for a couple of reasons. One, if a unit is regionally aligned, it understands that region’s culture. They understand the dynamics. They understand the nuances that are involved in that region. You also get something that we call repeat offenders, which is somebody seeing a problem set not for the first time, and then going away and doing something else, but they’re seeing that problem set over and over again, which builds a cognitive muscle memory in terms of what they’re seeing out in the region.
If a unit’s regionally aligned, they understand that region’s culture and dynamics.
They know the players. They’re developing relationships. This is a relationship business, specifically Special Forces. I don’t want to steal any thunder that you may have on this, but CSM mentioned he’s been in the group for twenty years. That’s twenty years of relationships with partners within the Middle East that he can call up or they can call him. That is unique and special, and it pays dividends.
Sergeant Major, I want to ask you about the concept of ‘by, with, and through’ because when we fight as Special Forces, that’s what we’re talking about, identifying a partner force, aligning with them, and then implementing this term ‘by, with, and through.’ What does it mean, and how does that complement the regional alignment?
I’d say ‘by, with, and through’, the words speak for itself in that, but that’s where you gain your rapport when you talk about long-term relationships with a partner force. When you’re working by them, with them, and through them, that’s where rapport is built. There are tons of vignettes for this, but I’ll use the Iraqi counter-terrorism force as an example.
I remember them well.
I grew up in this if you’re in the 5th Group, and I worked extensively with the ICTF. Those were our brothers. We trained together. We bled together. Those are long-term relationships that we leveraged, even going back into Iraq in 2014. If I didn’t have those specific relationships with some specific people, it would’ve been starting at the ground zero again. Working by, with, and through a partner is where you gain your rapport and truly build not only a partnership but a friendship with those individuals.
Working by, with, and through partners is where you gain rapport and truly build not only a partnership but a friendship with these individuals.
What about our allies? We talked a lot about our partners, but there’s also our allied nations, our NATO allies, and those who fight alongside us, who come from generally the same backgrounds as us.
We have allies here embedded within the 5th Group that work at our Advanced Skills Company. They take those lessons learned back to their organization, and they also bring us lessons learned.
They’ve been an important part. Somebody told me, I forget who, “American never fights alone.”
They never do. You can go back to the founding of this nation, and we have always fought with a partner every single time. I cannot think of a time we’ve gone into a conflict unilaterally. It’s always with somebody else, and if you’re a Special Forces guy, that’s important because we are a force multiplication organization. Whether you’re talking NATO partners or indigenous partners, it all adds up to a force-multiplying effect.
Let’s talk about the Middle East. Sergeant Major is laughing over there. He is not laughing because it’s an easy place to operate. It’s certainly a difficult place to operate. I think we’ve seen over time, it’s one of the more complex areas that we tackle not only as an Army, as a military, but even if you look at the spectrum of DIME, diplomatic, information, military, and economic powers, that our government leverages to exert influence.
General Votel, former CENTCOM, JSOC, and SOCOM Commander, and I had an in-depth discussion about the complexities that we face in the Middle East and the very natures of our relationships with partners, with allies, and with adversaries. You’re responsible for our Special Operations capability within the region. How do you assess the Middle East?
I could have ten hours for just that. I get this question a lot, and I would say, since October 7, 2023, and especially December of 2024, I do not have a crystal ball. You used to be able to read the tea leaves and see where things were trending in the Middle East, a little bit. I don’t think there’s a crystal ball available that could tell you what direction the Middle East is going. I’ve never seen so much change or volatility in the region as probably right now. You have a new Syrian government that’s in place. Nobody saw that happening. ISIS hasn’t gone away. They had their physical caliphate. A lot of pressure was applied. They’ve gone to safe havens out into the hinterlands in Syria, but given time, it is very feasible that you can see the ISIS problem come up again.
I’ve never seen so much change or volatility in the region than probably right now.
The 5th Group has certainly been involved in the region since inception, but if we look at the most tactical level deployment of forces, they carried a lot of the weight in Afghanistan. A lot of other groups, the 3rd Group specifically, carried and suffered great losses there. Everybody contributed to that mission for decades, but it was the 5th Group teams, along with the 160th, who will be with us tomorrow, right down the road here, who were there from start to finish. Sergeant Major, when you look at the global war on terror and you think about the impact the group had on the mission in Afghanistan, what comes to your mind?
It’s far to sum up in one word that you’d be proud. When you look back at the history of the 5th Group, it’s hard not to be proud, which brings your level of game up because, being the next generation from those guys, you feel like you owe it to them to ensure that you’re upholding those standards. I’m proud to be here. I’m proud to be part of this organization and to have the history that we have.
Looking back at the history of the 5th Special Forces Group, it’s hard not to feel proud.
I’m going to jump in there for a second because you see, that’s a great way to characterize it. There are a few reminders around this group to remind us of our role in the early days. Right over there, you got two I-beams, those from the World Trade Center, in the shape of a V, obviously for the 5th Group, Roman numerals. You see little things like that all across this group, and it goes back to what I mentioned at the top of the show, which is it is events like that are part of the culture and the DNA of the organization. What the CSM said in terms of not wanting to disappoint or let down the guys that came before us is a huge component of the success and the culture of this organization.
I think you see that too across the whole regiment when you talk to people who come from the 5th Group. They are proud of that series.
Some may call it a cult, Fran.
Coming from the 10th Group, we spent a lot of time rotating back and forth. In our days in Iraq, we would rotate back and forth with the 5th Group, and so we were able to see a lot of that. Now, we’re looking at what’s next. Where do we go from here in this concept of this large-scale combat operations coming into effect this term, LSCO? I think people are polarized in how they interpret this term, and I’ve had people who are crossing me and say, “I love it. I’m going to talk about it.” Another says, “I hate that term, and here’s how we define it,” but how do you define LSCO, large-scale combat operations?
I’ve been thinking about this over the weekend because I’m in the camp of not a fan of that term. I’d rather call it war or combat. I would say large-scale combat operations are nation-state on nation-state on a size, scale, and depth that you haven’t seen before. None of us has seen it. It is a large formation. It’s not non-state actors going at it or non-state actors and state actors. It is two state actors or multiple state actors going at it.
I think what defines it or characterizes it is scope, scale, and depth. When you think about how much sustainment would be required to go into something like large-scale combat operations, it blows your mind. When you think about what the CCIR level is for, let’s say a corps commander or a JTF commander, we did a warfighter this past summer, and what was interesting was what the CCIR level was for deaths or for a loss formation for that corps commander. I think the minimum CCIR was a battalion. If it’s less than a brigade, don’t wake me up. You’re like, “This is a new ballgame.”
That warfighter, which is for those that don’t know, is a giant simulation, but it was great for understanding what that size, scope, and depth equate to the large-scale combat operations. Something we hadn’t appreciated before, because when you compare it to the GWOT or CT operations, those are acute engagements, probably noncontiguous battle areas. You don’t have to worry so much about things like sustainment and protection. Protection, a little bit, but not on the size or scale that you would for large-scale combat operations. You do large-scale combat operations, you’re talking FLOTs that you’re trying to control terrain or advanced terrain. It’s a different ballgame entirely.
I think you have to find those things that overlap as well. I don’t think you can isolate what we’ve been doing in one bin and then let’s go into another bin. I think you have to figure out where things overlap. You need to be lethal in both. There’s a lot of overlap, but I think we’re bridging some of these gaps with the combat training centers. We are way more involved with the CTCs than we have been in the past, and we’re getting some good reps there, but I do think you have to acknowledge that a lot of our experiences are relevant in both. We need to continue to push forward and figure out those holes that we need to uncover or cover up.
I think the fight in Syria with this group was a pretty good example of lessons that apply to both, where this group was pushing a FLOT taking back terrain from ISIS. Was it a large-scale combat operation? By the definition, no, but there’s some overlap with some similarities. As we were talking about before we came on the show, the ability to pull on those lessons learned and put them back into the group, into our training, is a continuous cycle that we strive to achieve.
We think about that term, you think about nation-state on nation-state, peer on peer, near-peer on near-peer. You can go back to a few comments that have been made in 2024. The job of SOF is to keep the word near in front of peers as long as possible, but also, you think about the integration with conventional forces. We think about long-range fires out of the Army, like we’re seeing in Ukraine. We think about long-range precision bombing out of the Air Force. You think about the capability that comes off of our carrier strike groups out in the Navy. SOF now has to play a role and has to figure out, “What’s our role in the LSCO fight?” What is SOF’s role in that LSCO fight?
There are a couple of things we can do. One of the things we can do is provide that deep sensing capability that the rest of the joint force doesn’t have, or they may have it, but they need us. What that looks a lot like, honestly, or at least there’s a little bit of overlap, is a function that corollary used to provide. I get a lot of heat sometimes because old-timers will say, “We’re not corollary. We don’t do corollary stuff.” Time out. If not us, who? Last time I checked, special reconnaissance is a mission for SF.
I know, by the way, we’re not corollaries. What we do is we do things with a partner. We go where nobody else can go. If the big one kicks off, we will be what the nation needs us to be, so we will go forward. We will conduct deep sensing. We will conduct SR. That is a function. Let’s not forget what we are as a corp in terms of the SF regiment. We are a combat maneuver force. We do it with a partner. We talk about foundational skills and lethality. In this group, if you want to deploy, you’ve got to conduct a maneuver, live fire at night with a partner force. That applies to our current assigned mission.
When you think about what you do in the future fight in LSCO, I can see a LSCO fight where we’re taking a partner force, being that combat multiplier, and doing some maneuver warfare or combined arms maneuver warfare against a near-peer 100%. Deep sensing reconnaissance, providing the sensor to shooter required for long-range fire for that joint force combat arms maneuver warfare, I think there’s a role. Now, we’re not a panacea. We know our role. We have limitations, but I think it comes down to what gaps we can fill for that joint force because they can’t do everything.
I’ll also say, as I was thinking about this before we came on the show, what’s unique about us is our agility. We’re pretty agile. We don’t come with a large sustainment tail. We don’t have a lot of protection assets, but if you were to watch, I forgot, honestly, or did not have the right appreciation for how much effort it takes a brigade or higher to uncoil and conduct an attack and what it entails. That’s a lot of moving pieces that those guys have to go through. A little bit easier for SF folks or SF units of action. I think those are some of the functions that we can provide in that future fight.
I think the key to us, though, is being flexible. We might not know what we’re going to do yet. We might not have figured it out. I don’t know. I know Colonel Szody threw out some things that we can do, but I think there are some other options that are probably on the table that we’re going to discover in CTCs. It’s education at all echelons of what we can do and how we should be used.
I think, too, you incorporate the multi-domain fight. We’ve heard senior leadership, specifically General Braga, the USASOC commander, talk about the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad and how we are now in this LSCO fight, incorporating things like cyber warfare, the space fight? Where does that tie into the SOF mission?
That comes down to what we call our access and placement. You always hear about where SOF is located globally at any given time, the numbers and the stats, however many countries, number of people, but what he’s talking about when he talks about the triad is having SOF personnel in a place that only they can be providing the access for unique space and cyber capabilities. What he’s not talking about is having an 18 Series guy, an SF guy, turn them into a space or cyber operator.
That’s not the intent, although there are some folks out there with those capabilities. It’s providing the access and placement to leverage a space or cyber capability at a time of our choosing that ultimately supports the joint force. That’s what he’s getting at. It’s our access and placement for the line of troops that’s unique and allows the triad to be a thing.
My experience, like all of us here, was so much of that was consumed with the global war on terror, tactical decisions in a bottom up intel driven environment, meaning that we as ODA commanders, as infantry platoon leaders, as the unit of action on the ground embedded with the ISOF, we’re out there developing target packets, identifying the folks, the bad guys we had to go after, planning the operation, and then going out there and executing. Decisions by and large were made by team sergeants, team leaders, and split teams. You had junior NCOs in charge of formations and making tactical-level decisions. How does that change in large-scale combat operations?
When you were doing this, how far out were you thinking?
Tomorrow.
In LSCO, you’ve got to be thinking at least 96 hours out. You’ve got to be putting out guidance to detachments for them to operate off of for about 96 hours. It is a much more top-down-driven event than what we experienced growing up. You characterized it great. The GEOP and CT were a 24-hour targeting cycle. That was bottom-up driven. When you talk LSCO, you’ve got a JTF commander, a three- or four-star. He’s the guy in charge. It’s his plan that the corps or JTF is working to achieve.
The actions that we take have to be in line. We may call it unity of effort. They have to be aligned with what the overall plan is. There isn’t a whole lot of time for “Choose your own adventure. Go do what you want. Frame a chopie. Go pick whatever targets you wanna hit.” You may go out and execute, go after the right targets, but are they being done at the right time? That’s where it’s a much different ball game. You’ve got to think about all the different moving pieces. When you think about how many divisions, on the army side of the house, how many divisions would be involved or corps would be involved? There is a synchronization of effort and a unity of effort that has to be achieved for this stuff to be successful.
I think there are commanders as well, at Asheville, that have to be comfortable with not knowing everything. We’re still sending out daily sit-reps. There is a learning curve, not only on the tactical side of things, but also at commanders at echelon, understanding you might not get the picture painted like you’re used to getting the picture painted, but you’re still going to have to make hard decisions. There’s a ton of learning in that as well. I think that I’ve thrown out CTCs quite a bit, but I think the CTCs shake out some of that to get commanders comfortable with making decisions without knowing all of the information.
What’s the probability? I’ll frame that in terms of, we’ve seen our congressional leaders, we’ve seen our military leaders, we’ve seen our national intelligence leaders stand up and beat the drum, saying we are closer to the next terrorist-style attack than we are away from the last one being the 9/11 attacks. At the same time, we’re going to the CTCs. We’re talking about large-scale war, not combat, war against a near-peer or peer adversary, but what’s the higher likelihood?
That’s a good question. I don’t know what the higher likelihood is, but here’s what I do know. I would rather train for my worst day than anything else. This goes back to the lethality piece. I’ve seen commanders grapple with not knowing all the details of what mission they’re going to deploy to, like “What do I train on? Do I assume risk?” No, train for the hardest day. If I train for a near-peer fight, which is very much lethality-focused, I’m pretty sure I’ll be okay doing anything else. That’s my take.
I don’t know what the likelihood is, but the likelihood of a 5th Special Forces Group soldier engaging with an enemy in the Middle East is highly likely. We’re going to continue to be lethal. I don’t know the likelihood of LSCO, but I do know it’s highly likely that a member of a 5th Special Forces Group will engage in combat.
Fourteen Purple Hearts were awarded to individuals in 2024. We’re going to have two receive the Silver Star here pretty soon. It is a reality that guys deal with in this group. When guys show up to this group, you walk into the foyer, and you can tell it’s a new guy because he looks lost. He’s got his paper. He’s checking in. He’s like, “I’m here. I’m signing.” I was like, “Are you signing in?” “Yeah, you knew?” First question, was the 5th Group your first choice? Yes, it was. Why’d you choose the 5th Group? I figured it’d give me the best chance to go to combat. You are correct. The Middle East is the Wild West. You never know what’s going to happen. People don’t have a problem fighting here, and that’s the world that we live in, so we have to train for that reality.
I can’t guarantee a lot of things about your experience in Special Forces. A couple of things I can guarantee here are you’re going to be held accountable, and you’re going to deploy. Those are my two guarantees.
You’re going to be held accountable, and you’re going to deploy. Those are the two guarantees.
I’m glad he brought up training because Sergeant Major, I got to ask you, I heard that there are a couple of words here that get right down to the core. One of them is standards, and one of them is fundamentals. How do you define standards and fundamentals? What do they mean to you?
I do want to highlight one thing. The Colonel and I are training right now because it is cold out here, and he asked, “Should we wear some snivel?” I said, “No, we’re not doing it.”
I encouraged you to, by the way.
We’re not doing it. I’m going to be on film wearing a snivel.
This is the mark of a good Sergeant Major, and don’t cut this out.
Standards and fundamentals. I think when you break it down, why did somebody join Special Forces? I ask people this a lot. It’s usually the caliber of people in the standards and those types of things. Those are the things we’re not going to give up. I know there are a lot of jokes about the 5th Special Forces Group and the standards. You’ll still see some ridiculous mustaches rolling around here, but those combat focus standards we do not get away from, and we define them. With your M4, we’re lethal day or night, 600 meters and in, and that’s our standard. How do I know that? Because I hold you accountable for it. I have my tactical skills competition. There are levels of accountability throughout this group that ensure that we hold a standard.
You talk about fundamentals. I know the Colonel mentioned maneuvering live fire range at night with a partner. That’s shoot, move, communicate. It’s being more specific ensures you have fire control measures, both verbal and nonverbal. They’re not ‘check the block’ things, if that’s part of your validation process, and that’s riddled within your training calendar. There are those types of things we put in place. We talked about this before, or inside a little bit ago. There’s got to be a baseline in how everybody grows up.
I relate it to kids with reading, writing, and math. No matter where you go to school, you’re going to learn those things. If you come to the 5th Special Forces Group, what’s our equivalent of that? That’s maneuvering at night, shooting live rounds, fire control measures, owning 600 meters and in, MOS cross train, and being able to save your buddy. There are gates that you have to go through to ensure that you can do that.
I’m going to jump in because there’s a good story on this one. I mentioned the two Silver Stars our guys are going to get if you’re coming up. Talking with the guys who were wounded in that engagement afterwards, we asked them, “What’s your feedback?” They were at Walter Reed, and their response was great. They said, “We were in this weird, jacked-up scenario where they’re like, ’18 Delta, you’re down. 18 Bravo, you’re now the Delta. Return fire, move an obscene distance over hilly terrain to a pickup site.’ It was like training.” I think if you’re a leader, that’s the best feedback you can get to where your guys were in a pretty bad spot, but what got them through it was hard training that didn’t compromise on foundational skills.
I think a big part of hard training, though, is accountability, the leader’s accountability. We talk about leader engagement. What does that mean? It means you’re not bringing Gatorades out on Wednesday. I need you to look at the training calendar, and I need you to see what important training is going on throughout the week. I need you to be out there. We are younger. I think that’s common knowledge at this point. Oftentimes, the Team Sergeant is the master trainer and also the primary trainer, so getting an extra set of eyes out there for all Bravo right rifle, getting the Sergeant Major out there. What it does is it makes everybody’s job a little bit harder, but that’s okay. That’s why we do it. Those leaders holding people accountable make us better.
I think when we look at the training, too, we can tie that training piece into that war-fighting function of protection because we have to be able to be ready for any fight. As we’ve talked about the various threats that remain out there, at your level, you talked about training for your worst day. How are you consistently reinforcing to the Team Sergeant, who might be younger, who may have a certain set of experiences, but not others, that there’s a variety of complex challenges that you may be asked to respond to on any given day, and your job is to be a subject matter expert, ready to do so?
I’d say some of the stuff we’re asking them to do, the knowledge level lies one level higher than what it used to. That’s okay if you acknowledge it and say that’s an issue. That forces engagement, but you have to have leaders willing to learn. That’s my red line. If you’re a leader and you’re not willing to learn, you’re not willing to embrace feedback, you’re not willing to accept other people’s experiences to bridge these gaps. What we’re trying to do is we’re trying to bridge gaps. The best way to do that is to leverage other people’s experiences.
Let’s talk about the guys. We look at sustainment being another of the war-fighting functions. We’ll tie it into recruiting, and we’ll talk about the unit’s ability to survive not only on the battlefield, but as an organization over a long period of time. Each of you has been around the army, around Special Forces for a while. Sir, you went to West Point, spent time in a ranger battalion, served in the 1st Group, 10th Group, and now the 5th Group. Sergeant Major, we joked, you’ve been here since the dawn of the 5th Group. Different experiences, but you come together as a command team. For a second, can you each talk about why you even joined the Army in the first place, but then why in the Green Beret?
My family has a history of serving. My dad served in Vietnam. My grandfather and his brother were in World War II. One was in the Pacific. One walked across France. Great-grandfather was gassed during World War I in Europe. I think I’ve got another great-great-grandfather who also served. I grew up with it, but why SF? I can remember back to when I was in high school. There was a Vietnam-era Green Beret who swung by the high school. He gave a little bit of pep talk. It was one of those career counselor days, but what he had to say sucked me in. The way he carried himself, the way he talked, based on his personal experiences, I was immediately sucked in.
I’m not one of those guys who say, “I watched John Wayne’s The Green Berets, and that’s how I got.” No. It was that one individual, that NCO who came to my high school, who was able to relay his personal stories from Vietnam that piqued my interest. I was a history nerd in high school, and I knew I wanted to go into the military, but the more I started scratching the surface of SF, the more I realized that’s what I want. The power of twelve individuals to combat multiply with an indigenous force, that’s what I want to be a part of. That’s what drew me in. That’s why I joined SF.
I know you mentioned you went to West Point. I was a Coupeville High School graduate, class of ’97. I don’t think you have that in your notes over there.
It’s in the all-star section over here.
For me, I came in at seventeen years old, and it wasn’t because I had all these options and I had zero options. I was at my social peak in high school.
I think you’re at your social peak now.
I was in my social peak, didn’t do well in school, and didn’t have a ton of options for me. To get my parents off my back, I was like, “I’m going to join the Army.” I joked around with them one time. I was like, “I’m going to be a garbage man. They get paid well,” and they made me take out the garbage all the time, so I switched it up. It was a spurt like, “I’m going to join the Army.” Not a lot of thought was put into it.
I wasn’t from a military family. I joined the infantry. I could run fast. I would shine my boots. I was a dream private, dog tags, ID card, pen and paper, and I could run fast. I was in the infantry for a while. They coaxed me into re-enlisting. They said, “What do you want to re-enlist?” I was like, “I’m going to re-enlist for Ranger School.” They’re like, “All right, easy deal.” I re-enlisted to go to Ranger School and got done with that. I was in a PX at Fort Lewis at the time. I saw a 1st Group guy, and he had all these badges.
I had no idea what they were. I was like, “That guy’s sweet,” and researched it. 1st Group is the one that got me to go to selection, and then a bunch of us came to the 5th Group. I got done with the Q Course in 2004. Got off to a rough start because I had to teach for a year on small-unit tactics. Got here in 2005, and I haven’t left for twenty years.
I want to ask you about something that the former Sergeant Major of the Army, Dan Dailey, brought up, whom I had a chance to talk to. He was my 1st Battalion Sergeant Major when I was a platoon leader and was hugely impactful in my early career. I had a chance to sit down with him now that he’s at AUSA. We talked about the American dream and how the Army is recruiting right now, and we’ll talk about the fact that SF has not been immune to the Army recruiting challenges over the last couple of years. There’s this idea in America now that you can’t pursue the American dream if you don’t go to college.
We’ve put college on this pedestal, and we’ve forgotten about things like the trades or the Army and how the Army is a path to be able to do that. I’m reminded of it here because you talked about, you didn’t go to West Point, you didn’t go to college, and yet you sit here twenty-plus years later in command of your units within our military, who’s called upon as a first phone call many times in defense of the nation.
I think about this a lot. I talked about myself when I was seventeen years old and social peak, and I needed something in my life, but I made the smartest decision of my life when I was probably the biggest idiot. That was to join the Army. I look around at everything I have now and all the opportunities as my daughter goes to college using my GI Bill and all of these things and how successful, not only I’ve been, but my family has been throughout these years, owning a home, all these things that people, I think, couple with the American dream. I have that. I’m a Coupeville High School graduate, class of ’97, towards the bottom of the class.
The path exists. Let’s talk about recruiting for a second, because I think two things can be true. I think that there’s a lack of propensity to serve in American culture right now. I think that our generation, those of us who are out and those of us who are still serving in many ways, could be argued to have done too good of a job in protecting this nation. We did our job, and that’s what was asked of us, but the majority of the nation has forgotten 9/11. They forgot and don’t know.
Because they weren’t born. I’ve got people in the formation who weren’t born before 9/11. It’s crazy to us because it’s something that’s been part of our entire career until you see it and you put yourself in their shoes, you’re like, “Actually, we’re old now.” It’s not that crazy, but there’s a contextual dissonance between us old timers and the people who are growing up.
I do think that there are people out there who want to serve. There are people out there who will be very good in service. What’s required is for them to be motivated to serve. What we’ve seen over the last couple of years, that we’re seeing a pendulum shift now, and if you go back to the early days of Afghanistan into Iraq, it was the flag stood tall. The call to service was there.
Everybody jumped on board, and then we went into an era where we saw a softer side of Army marketing. “Come into the Army. We have a job for you. There are a million MOSs, you can do anything.” At the end of the day, the job of a soldier, the job of a Green Beret, is to close with and destroy the enemy. Warfighting is a critical component of that, and that is what we’re being asked to do. When you look at those who are coming into the ranks now, what do you see?
I’ll say we are getting the right people. I will speak for my formation, my unit. When we get people coming in from the key course, we are getting the right people. The people who want to serve want to be challenged. They’re doing it for all the right reasons. What’s cool, and I acknowledge, I’m going to be talking mostly about our 18th Series folks because that’s the core lifeblood of this unit. You get people coming into this formation who were very successful on the outside, as part of that mix of folks that come in. You’ll get everything from lawyers to rocket scientists, down to very young folks who come in who enlisted at twenty years old.
They’re all the right people. That’s what we’re seeing. Do you get a little bit of a cross-section of society? That’s the way I like to put it. You sure do, but that’s okay. By that, I mean, do we still have some discipline issues across the formation? Yeah, you’ve got young kids. Show me a point in time in our Army history where you didn’t have that problem. You’re not, but by and large, we are getting the right folks, especially on the SS side of the house.
We think about the Q Course, which is an MOS-producing place. It’s an MOS-producing school. In other words, they are getting trained in their military occupational specialty. That’s what they are certified in when they leave the Q Course. The real training starts when they get here at the Group. This gets into the training side of the house, which is the Sergeant Major’s passion and love language. Mine, too, but that is where we take that basic entry-level SF individual. We are putting the screws to them, training them, and making them masters of their craft.
I think for me, what kept me in was camaraderie, but they truly got the most out of me. I think that our responsibility is to get the most out of every soldier that comes into this unit. When you do that, you get a sense of purpose, which drives them to stay in. The goal is not only getting them into the Army, but retaining them within the Army. We talked about my experiences. I didn’t have a ton of options.
Some of these guys have a lot of options. We have former NFL players who are across the street right now. They have a ton of options that I didn’t have. When it comes to staying in, they look at, “Do I get out or do I stay in?” I’d say if you get the most out of them and you give them exactly what they signed up for, then your ability to retain them is much higher. I think you get that at the 5th Special Forces Group.
I’m going to steal a line from you. Tell me if I’m screwing this up. “He’s not going to be the reason that…”
Yeah, you’re screwing it up.
Yeah, I’m screwing it up, so you do it.
I tell people there are so many microcultures within this organization. What kept me in was my teammates. It wasn’t the group CSM. He has zero to do with it. I’m probably not going to be the reason why somebody stays in, but my goal is not to be the reason why they get out. I think sometimes people get into certain positions, they become the reason why somebody gets out, and they didn’t have to.
See, I totally botched that. The other thing is that what’s important to the retention piece is the empowerment of your people. I think this is what CSM was getting at, but you’ve got to be able to empower everybody in your formation to do what they need to do within the limits of their control. I think that’s bred into the SF culture, but empowerment leads to individuals finding their purpose.
I love empowering because now they own it. Now, I get to hold them accountable. People love saying it until they’re empowered. I own that now.
When you own it, it’s another ball game.
There’s no hiding.
Your results are greater.
We talked about the role of our partners and allies and by, with, and through. At the end of the day, one of the reasons we partner by, with, and through is because America can’t solve everyone’s problem across the globe at every given time. We have to go out there. We have to develop the capability. We saw this in Africa when you sent me to every country in East Africa to go find units that were capable of doing that. Some with success, others not, but that’s exactly what it’s about. It’s finding leaders who are willing to solve their own challenges. We’ll give them the tools, we’ll give them the training, and then they’ve got to get out there and do it for themselves when we’re not there.
Let’s talk about fires, but also tie that into equipment. Technology is front and center in modern warfare. We’re seeing it across the world right now. Drones, automation, sensors. Every SOF leader we’ve talked to has brought it up. General Braga was quoted this morning by the Association of the United States Army, talking about the advancement of technology, saying that the side that innovates through this ecosystem the fastest will win.
We have seen in every discussion our senior leaders talking about the retooling of the MTOE and changing and asking the question, is the twelve-man ODA in its current construct the future? Does it need to be bigger? Do we need more skills? Are we going to introduce a robotics or a UAS capability into the tactical element? How is the 5th Group implementing things like unmanned aerial vehicles, robotics, and advanced technology at the ODA and group level?
I’ll touch on the procurement piece first. There’s a difference between procurement and innovation at our level. On the procurement side of the house, you’re well aware of what kind of a mess that is, right? When we talk about counter-UAS systems, that is a procurement issue that the 5th Special Forces Group, which I, as a commander, cannot solve. I have to rely on the industry to help me solve that problem. As you know, because the procurement problem is so bureaucratic, it takes years for solutions to get into the hands of our people. That’s the way that it’s been.
I know folks are trying to figure out a more streamlined process, but we don’t solve the procurement problem here at 5th Group. What we do solve for problems here at Group are issues that we can control, so training and education. You mentioned drones. Here’s the deal with drones, small UAS systems, and uncrewed systems. You’re not going to go to combat again without those capabilities, nor will you see those capabilities or not see those capabilities used against you.
They were used against this group in Syria during the ISIS fight, so it’s not a novel concept. It’s been used before. What we’re doing here at 5th Group, though, and we did our first iteration, training at iteration, is training SUAS, small UAS operators, so that we can proliferate trained and educated folks across the formation. What we’re not doing is we’re going out and chasing the latest group one or group two drone. If you look at the lessons learned from Ukraine, the TTPs and the tech evolve on a 3- to 6-month cycle, so you’re not going to be able to chase technology because it’s not feasible.
What you can do is train a baseline across your formation. If you can fly a small UAS system and do it well, you should be able to change out the system itself when those evolutions in tech change and still be proficient. It’s like grabbing a stick and then an automatic. Our focus is getting folks trained and educated on the systems themselves, being able to fly, build, and pilot. That’s a win for us. We’ve done some things here at Group that have enabled us to do it at a faster pace.
We worked out arrangements with the FAA and the post so that we can walk out right behind this building right here, or behind a team room, and fly drones without pre-approved clearances, which sounds crazy, I know, but those things do fly. We are on an army installation where there are helicopters and aircraft, but we figured it out. What we’re trying to do is break down barriers for training and education on a capability that we’re not going to combat with or going to combat without.
I think it comes down to, what’s our role at the Group in all that? You can give out training guidance and things like that, but it comes down to expectation and opportunity, and those things have to interlock. Where we put a ton of focus is providing that opportunity because the expectation at all echelons is that we know how to use this stuff and we’re training on it. Oftentimes, the opportunity isn’t there because of procurement or whatever that barrier is. We’re there to knock down those barriers to ensure they have the opportunity.
Our secret sauce here at Group is our people. That’s our superpower. We keep getting the right people, we’re going to be okay, I have no doubt. You get the right people, you give them the right training, you develop the right leaders, you’re going to be all right. You could always want the next cool piece of kit, next bit of tech, but I think, and I honestly mean this, as long as we’re getting the right people, we’re going to be okay. I could always use more money. I could always use more time. I know General Ferguson and his team are working to get us a little more time because when you’re always deploying, you’re limiting factors, the amount of time you have to train so you can maintain readiness. I would say people and time. Those are the two things that you have to have to be successful.
Our secret sauce at 5th Special Forces Group is our people; that’s truly our superpower.
I think we do. I say that because General Ferguson is one of those leaders you want to work for and you don’t want to let down. I think we have what we have, and we’re going to do our best with what we’ve got. If there are opportunities to get more, he’s going to get it for us.
Here’s another thing. We’ve talked about the experience gap. There is an experience gap compared to when we were on teams twenty years ago, but I am routinely amazed by the quality of people that are in the formation and the quality of the teams. Take the experience gap, move it to the side. I hear some of these detachment commanders talking now, and the company commanders, and I am blown away by how proficient they are. I’m usually left thinking, “I wish I were that good when I was in his shoes.” I know it’s a little bit of a dichotomy to say the experience gap is an issue, but we have quality people. It’s a fact, so I am happy with what we have in the formation.
We have great people. It’s our responsibility to get the most out of them. We have great leaders, and I think we’re in a good spot.
We owe them opportunities and resources. That’s our job.
The last warfighting function is intelligence. We can think about lessons learned. You can think about it at an organizational level. You can think about it over your career. As you know, we like to close these discussions where we talk about our own habits, our own fundamentals, and our own lessons learned throughout our careers. I’ve always framed them as the Jedburghs had to do three things. Those were their fundamentals. They could be yours. You can name them.
I’m going to ask you that in a second, but they had to be able to shoot, move, and communicate. If they did those three things with precision, they could fight the Germans, arm the French resistance, and solve complex challenges. The question for you both is, as you look at your career, you look at the things that you’ve done through all echelons of service, what are the three things that you each do as your daily foundational habits to set the conditions for success?
I’m going to tell you that from now on, one thing that I’m going to do as a personal habit is bring snivel gear anywhere I go, because it is not warm. Lesson learned.
It’s the wind. It’s the wind that’s coming.
I’m going to flip that question on you. I could talk about sleep, PT, and eating right. Here are three things that I would ask my people to do. I would hope that my people are training like they would fight in the real world. We’ve talked a lot about that over the last however many minutes. I would hope that my people are developing their subordinates and instilling a culture of accountability. The third thing I would hope my people are doing is I would hope that they are finding some semblance of balance in their lives.
Balance doesn’t look the same for everybody. Balance for me looks much different than the single detachment commander who lives in Nashville. Different levels of balance. I got a couple of kids, a wife, group commander. The balance is inherently personal. It’s not 9:00 to 5:00. It doesn’t mean 9:00 to 5:00. It means figuring out, based on your unique set of requirements, what balance looks like. Those would be the three things that I hope my people are doing.
Three things that I try to do every day. I start out early, knock out PT early. When I’m at work, I try to engage with as many soldiers as I can. I think that’s the best part of my job. That’s where I find the problems. There’s no better person to find a problem than an E4 or E3. The soldiers are so fun to talk to and get their input. I try to engage with soldiers as much as I can while I’m at work. Say the final thing, and the boss touched on it a little bit, is the balance, but I try not to give my family the leftovers. When you do these jobs, you’re 110%. Oftentimes, when you get home, you have about 10% left. You might need to crank an energy drink or something. You’ve got to fill your role at the house and try not to give them the leftovers.
Yeah, that’s good advice. Train like you fight. Develop subordinates and accountability. Find the balance defined for yourself. Get out of PT early. Engage with as many as possible. Don’t give the family the leftovers. Can I add one more for you, CSM, because we talked about it earlier, and I think it’s important to put it into this conversation? You told me that we have a responsibility to be real with ourselves about where we think we are, where we are, and where we wanna be. Can you explain that?
Yeah, so it comes down to your brand and reality. It’s easy to get lost in the brand. I think the 5th Special Forces Group has a great brand, but is that in line with reality? The goal is always to outpace your brand. You want to hear, “I knew they could do that, but I had no idea they could do that.” That is the goal. If you put it at echelons, and CSM Gitlin’s good at articulating this, it’s where you say you are, where you think you are, and where you are.
We’ll hold you accountable and figure out the reality of that. As long as you have the willingness to get better and learn, we’ll work it out. At the end of the day, we’re not going to live off a brand here. We’re going to deal with reality. We’re going to embrace being Green Berets, working by, with, and through a partner force. We’re going to shoot live rounds at night. We’re going to be lethal. There will be more firefights for the 5th Special Forces Group soldiers in the Middle East. We will be ready for those, and we’re going to train our asses off.
We’re going to deal with reality. We’re going to embrace being Green Berets working by, with, and through a partner force.
I can’t sum it up better than that. I appreciate your time.
Thanks.
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